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Investment in human capital is a critical part of India‟s strategy for development. 
Cognitive test scores are an increasingly well accepted measure of human capital. 
Recent evidence suggests that it is not mere completion of given levels of schooling 
but rather what is learnt at school that matters to both individual earnings and to 
national economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). If private and public 
schools differ in terms of their effectiveness in imparting learning, then the choice of 
private or public school has implications for people‟s life-time earnings and for 
national growth. Thus, the question of the relative effectiveness of private and public 
schools is of considerable policy significance in India and elsewhere. 
 
This human capital formation has traditionally occurred in government funded 
schools but since liberalisation in 1991, private schools increasingly offer an 
alternative.  According to household survey data, private schooling participation in 
rural India has grown from 10% in 1993 to 23 percent of the student population in 
2007 (Kingdon, 2007); this is much higher than in most developed countries. Private 
school participation is considerably higher in urban India. The high demand hints at 
dissatisfaction with government schooling and the superior results of private schools 
suggest that these schools do a better job than government schools.  
 
Private schools in India have generally less qualified teachers than government 
schools and operate using much lower levels of capital. However, private schools 
operate within the market and as a result have strong incentives to be competitive. 
Private schools hire teachers who often do not have a teaching certificate and pay 
them a fraction of the salaries of government schools, but they hire more teachers to 
reduce class sizes. The heads have far greater control over hiring and firing of 
teachers and thus are able to exhibit tighter control, have higher attendance and only 
retain effective teachers.(Nechyba, 2000; Peterson et al, 2003) 
 
The primary research question of this paper is to examine the relative effectiveness of 
private and public schools. Conceptually one models the education production 
function, where the output is cognitive achievement and the school type is included as 
one of the input variables.  The main methodological issue with estimating these 
education production functions is that the choice of school type is related to 
unobserved variables that are also correlated with cognitive achievement which would 
bias estimation. This paper uses a series of different methodologies to control for 
these unobserved variables and reduce the bias.  
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the literature, outlining the economics of 
private schooling; this is followed by a critical discussion of the methodologies used 
to investigate private school effects, outlining some of the results found in the 
empirical work. Section 3 explains the nature of the data used, outlining the strengths 
and weaknesses. Section 4 demonstrates how the methodologies were applied to this 
data and presents the results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the outcomes 
of this research.     5 
2  Theory, Literature and Methods 
2.1  Economic Theory  
2.1.1  The Participation Decision 
The decision for a child to participate in education, or in private school education, can 
be thought of as an outcome of household cost-benefit analysis. The costs may be 
opportunity costs (forgone wages, forgone domestic help) or direct costs such as 
tuition fees. Benefits would include increased human capital and higher wages. The 
participation decision is made in two stages, the first to attend any kind of school, and 
second given that one will attend school, whether to attend government or private 
school.  
 
Depending on the fee level, the costs associated with fee-charging schools may be 
large or small compared to the opportunity cost of not being able to participate in the 
labour market or help at home. It is claimed that many Indian children combine some 
form of employment with study, and this may be more compatible with „free‟ 
(government) schooling as the household does not pay for the schooling missed due to 
work (Campaign Against Child Labour, 1997). Additional costs of schooling include 
transport, uniforms, materials and books used in school and other less direct costs 
such as the effort of enrolling children, preparing them for school and motivating 
them to attend.  
 
The primary benefit of schooling, and of private schooling, is the wage premium 
derived from higher levels of – or better quality of – education. In addition to 
potentially higher cognitive skills and thus higher economic returns from private (than 
government) schooling, there may be non-cognitive advantages to attending private 
schools, such as access to a superior peer group. Demand for private schooling could 
also be demand for a differentiated education since different religious and linguistic 
communities often run denominational or „minority‟ schools which provide an 
acculturation in the desired language or religion.  
 
It is an obvious statement that higher quality schooling would increase the returns 
from education yet concepts such as schooling quality are difficult to estimate, 
covering a number of different notions such as resources, teacher quality and the 
organisational structure.  
 
Hanushek‟s (2003) meta analysis of school quality finds little evidence that increasing 
inputs results in increased outcomes, concluding that commonly used „input‟ policies 
are inferior to „incentive‟ related policies within schools. This suggests that it may not 
be material differences that make the private schools more effective/attractive, but 
more to do with their organisational structure, something that is far less easily 
observed. Krueger (2003) criticizes the meta-analysis methodology and in any case 
such issues may be compounded in analysis of education outcomes in developing 
countries due to the massive heterogeneity in their education sectors and education 
policies. 
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The teachers at private schools are different from those at state schools and face 
different recruitment and reward structures. Estimating the difference in teacher 
quality is a difficult process because what makes an effective teacher is not well 
defined or clearly understood. Teacher quality is usually judged by the qualifications 
of the teacher (both academic and professional qualifications), and also by the number 
of years of experience. As private schools in India often employ teachers that have 
somewhat lower academic qualifications and that typically do not hold a teaching 
certificate, superficially their teacher quality appears lower. However parameters such 
as effort and motivation of a teacher are much more difficult to measure, though most 
likely more pertinent to their level of effectiveness, and these less tangible measures 
of teacher quality may differ between the government and private schools because of 
private-public sector differences in reward, incentives and accountability structures.   
 
Extant Indian studies are consistent in suggesting that private schools in India are, on 
average, more internally efficient than government schools. They are more cost-
efficient on average costing only about half as much per student as public schools. 
Private schools are also more technically efficient, producing higher achievement 
levels (after controlling for student intake) and making more efficient use of inputs, 
for example having more students per class and lower teacher absenteeism.(Bashir, 
1997; Govinda and Varghese, 1993; Kingdon, 1996; Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006; 
Tooley and Dixon, 2005). However, the existing studies are often based on data from 
particular regions of India (rather than national data), or use individual methods that 
do not yield convincing estimates of the private school effect. In this study, we use an 
extremely large national dataset on child achievement as well as a variety of 
econometric approaches to quantify the private school effect. 
2.1.2  The ‘Production’ of Learning 
In economics a production function is used to model how inputs are converted by a 
firm into outputs. In the same way an educational production function can be 
constructed to show how effective particular inputs into a child‟s education improve 
cognitive achievement (Monk, 1989).  
 
The inputs of educational production can be divided into individual child level inputs, 
household inputs and school inputs. The child brings their natural aptitude, motivation 
and effort, maturity (measured by age), gender and health, and these will all have a 
bearing on his or her achievement. The household resources contribute to the child‟s 
education, financially, nutritionally and also through the home environment e.g. 
whether it is conducive to study. The parent‟s ability and motivation are also 
important, while their education, income and occupation will all have a bearing on the 
child‟s outcomes.   School quality determines child‟s outcomes through a combination 
of infrastructure, resources, teacher quality and the organisational structure. Though 
individual and household factors may be more important than school factors in 
determining outcomes, school quality is the area of policy interest. The government 
can do relatively less about the child or household characteristics at least in the short 
to medium term, whereas policy changes can actually make some difference to school 
quality. 
 
The output of education production function is the increase in human capital. In the 
long term this can be measured using wage returns, but while the child is still at   7 
school the output is cognitive achievement measured by a test. Such a measure is only 
a proxy for all the attributes of an individual that may be pertinent to the earnings of 
the student once they join the labour force. 
 
The marginal benefits of private education over state education are hinted at by the 
increasing demand and better results of these schools. However such a result is not 
conclusive because these higher levels of achievement may be the result (partly or 
wholly) of self-selection of superior students into private education. These differences 
may include superior ability or higher motivation of parents and students. Such 
differences may drive the apparent superiority of results of private schooling. The 
following section outlines methods to overcome the problem of identifying a private 
school effect. 
2.2  Identification of the Private School Effect 
A „full model‟ of the education production function is shown in equation 1. Where 𝑦
 
is the cognitive outcome, ? is an intercept, 𝑃 is the private school indicator for each 
individual, ?  is a vector of all characteristics that affect cognitive achievement and ? 
is the individual deviation from the average effect. In this full model ? can be 
interpreted as the true causal effect on achievement of an individual attending a 
private school.  
 
  𝑦 = ? + ?𝑃 + 𝜏? + ?  (1) 
 
There are many factors that affect learning only some of which are observed. In 
equation 2, ? is now decomposed into the observed variables ? and unobserved 
variables ?. 
 
  𝑦 = ? + ?𝑃 + ?? + 𝜑? + ?   (2) 
 
In practice the model we estimate can only include the vector of observed elements ?, 
while the unobserved component  ?  is part of the error term (along with the 
individual shocks), as in equation 3. 
 
  𝑦 = ? + ?𝑃 + ?? + ?  (3) 
 
Unobserved factors that determine child achievement – such as the child‟s and 
family‟s motivation, ability and ambition, teacher effort, headmaster quality, school 
ethos etc., are included in the error term ?. There may even be some factors such as 
child health which are potentially observable and measurable but in fact are not 
available in most datasets and are thus omitted from W, i.e. they are not part of X and 
are included in ?.  If these variables merely influence achievement (y, the dependent 
variable) but are uncorrelated with the school-type indicator (private/public school), 
then the private school dummy variable P does not suffer from any omitted variable 
bias.  However, if P is systematically correlated with factors included in ? that also 
affect student achievement, then P is an endogenous variable.  In this case the 
coefficient ? is not a measure of the true causal effect of attending private school on 
student achievement. A naïve model, such as that in equation 3  – including just a 
private school dummy – will give biased estimates as ? picks up the effect of other   8 
factors associated with private schooling as well, rather than estimating a „pure‟ 
private school effect. 
 
The aim of this research is to estimate the effect of private schools on cognitive 
achievement. The challenge is do so in such a way that the effect is truly identified. 
The impact evaluation literature gives several tools to estimate the impact, on student 
achievement, of private schools attendance. We discuss these different approaches 
first and assess their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
The earliest studies of the private school effect used a private school dummy variable 
and a series of controls to identify a private school effect (Halsey, A and Ridge, 1980) 
in the UK,  (Psacharopoulos, 1987) in Colombia and Tanzania and (Govinda and 
Varghese, 1993) in India. The problem with this method is that it treats the private 
school dummy variable as exogenous, which it is unlikely to be since, in most 
societies, children from better off and presumably more educationally-oriented homes 
are more likely to attend private schools.  
 
Most of the current studies that use OLS as a method for estimating the private school 
effect are aware of the endogeneity issue, but use these estimates as a baseline from 
which to make further estimates that try to control for this problem. The OLS private 
school dummy baseline provides an upper bound of the private school effect, because 
it includes the effect from other unobserved variables in addition to the „pure‟ effect 
of private schooling on cognitive outcomes. 
2.3  Experimental Estimates of the Private School Effect  
In estimating the effect of private schooling on achievement, one can only observe an 
individual attending any one type of school. What one would like to do is measure the 
achievement level of a sample of school children in private school, and then to 
measure the achievement level of the same sample in state schools, and find the 
difference between the two averages. The crux of the issue is that one cannot observe 
the counterfactual i.e. the effect of another type of schooling on the same set of 
individuals.  
 
If there are unobserved differences between individuals at different types of schools, 
then children in state schools do not form a valid comparator group for children in 
private schools and the estimates of the private school effect would be biased. One 
way to ensure that the groups of individuals being compared are similar is to 
randomly assign individuals to different school types, then observed and unobserved 
characteristics are randomly (and hence equally) distributed between the treatment 
and control groups. In this case – providing the randomisation worked as intended – 
comparing the average achievement of children in treatment and control groups would 
give the true causal effect of private school attendance. 
 
School vouchers provide a convenient method of randomly assigning school choice. 
Peterson et al. (2003) outline three randomised voucher schemes in the U.S. If 
vouchers are distributed randomly, the group that receive them (and chooses private 
schooling) should not be different from the control group (who would be less likely to 
choose private schooling). The results showed that private school effects are not   9 
always significantly positive for all groups in society and there is a difference in 
effects between regions. For the developing world, Angrist et. al. (2002) and Angrist 
et. al. (2006) provides two examples of studies that use the randomized control trial 
(RCT) method to estimate the private school effect in Colombia. These show positive 
effects of private schooling on student achievement as well as on additional outcomes 
such as completion rates, though the magnitude of the benefits varies between groups. 
2.3.1  Natural Experiment Alternative  
In the absence of random allocation, one can exploit exogenous variation in treatment 
caused by an event such as a policy change. The variation could be a planned social 
experiment- or a natural experiment. As with the random controlled trial the „effect‟ is 
calculated using the „difference in difference‟ method i.e. by comparing achievement 
– before and after the intervention – of the treatment and control groups. However 
there are likely to be underlying differences in the unobserved characteristics between 
children in the control and treatment groups. These differences are mitigated using a 
matching strategy, or modelling participation in the treatment group using a Heckman 
two step approach.  
 
The motivation behind matching is to improve the similarity between the treatment 
(private) and control (state) school groups of individuals; the objective is to find a 
good counterfactual (control) unit for each treated unit such that the control unit is as 
similar as possible to the treated unit. . One either selects or weights the control group 
according to their propensity of an individual to be in the treatment group for the 
analysis. The advantage of this method is that it pares the large comparator group 
down to only those units that are similar to the units in the treatment group (on the 
basis of their pre-treatment observed characteristics). However, the drawback of this 
approach is that matching of treatment and control units is necessarily done on their 
vector of observed characteristics – they could still differ in terms of their unobserved 
traits such as ability, ambition, motivation and effort. 
 
2.3.2  Instrumental Variable Estimation  
An alternative approach to estimating the impact of a variable is to use two stage least 
squares estimation. This uses an instrument (which may or may not arise from a 
natural experiment), a variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable but not 
otherwise correlated with the unobserved factors that affect the outcome of interest 
(cognitive achievement, in our case). Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation uses the 
common variation between the instrument and endogenous variable, and uses only 
this variation in determining the estimate of the effect of the variable of interest. 
(Wooldridge, 2002 chapter 18).  
 
While the IV approach is sometimes used convincingly in the education production 
function literature, for example (Angrist and Lavy, 1999), it is often difficult to find 
good instruments, and there are many examples in the literature of weak instruments 
that only poorly predict the endogenous variable.  
 
In the context of estimating a private school effect, it is difficult to think of variables 
that would affect choice of private (versus state) school but would not otherwise   10 
affect student achievement. Most factors that affect a child‟s choice of private or 
public school also affect his/her achievement outcome. A variable that has been used 
as an instrument for private school attendance in an achievement study on Nepal is 
„the number of private schools available in the child‟s area of residence‟ (Sharma, 
2009). Here the assumption is that the number of private schools in an area is 
plausibly exogenous to the private/public school choice of a given family, though the 
criticism of such an approach of course is that it will reflect the collective choice of 
the parents in the area.  
 
In a specialised context the IV technique has been used in estimating a private school 
effect, namely in the literature on vouchers.  Though the distribution of a voucher may 
be random, the expected effect of attending private school may still be endogenous. 
To allow for this, „receipt of a voucher‟ (when vouchers are randomly allocated) can 
be used as an instrument for „attending private school‟ since those who obtained a 
voucher in the Colombian voucher lottery were much more likely to choose to attend 
private school, yet the receipt of the voucher was not correlated with the unobserved 
characteristics of the children (Angrist et al, 2002). They show that the effect of 
„using the voucher‟ (i.e. attending private school) was 50% greater than the estimate 
of simply „winning the voucher‟ (but then not using it to attend a fee-paying school). 
 
However, this type of an approach is available only where there is already randomised 
allocation of children to private and public schools, whether through vouchers or 
otherwise.  In most developing countries in general – and in India in particular – there 
is no randomised allocation of students to private and public schools. 
 
2.3.3  Heckman Selection Model 
The classic application of correction for „selection‟ (using the Heckman sample 
selectivity correction approach) is in the estimation of wage equations where the 
missing are the unemployed, for whom wage data is necessarily missing.  This 
approach has also been used for estimating school effects where the outcome data (e.g. 
achievement scores) are not missing for different types of schooling, but where 
separate achievement production functions are estimated for private and state school 
student samples.  
 
Sample selection bias refers to problems where the outcome equation is estimated for 
a restricted, non-random sample rather than for the population as a whole.  Since in 
each of the separate achievement equations the sub-sample on which the equation is 
fitted (e.g. the private school sample and the state school sample) is not necessarily a 
random draw from the whole student population but rather a self-selected sub-sample, 
an important basic assumption of the classical linear regression model is violated, 
namely that the error term be independent of the included variables. Thus, simple 
OLS estimation of an achievement equation for private schoolers, and a simple OLS 
estimation of an achievement equation for state schoolers would both suffer from 
endogenous sample selectivity bias.   
 
The choice of private school is endogenous if there are unobserved attributes of the 
individual and family that are related to the choice of school type that are also 
correlated with the cognitive achievement outcome.  Thus, the problem of sample   11 
selection bias when achievement equations are separately estimated for private and 
public school sectors is akin to the problem of endogeneity of a private school dummy 
variable in an achievement equation estimated for the whole sample.  
  
Heckman‟s approach involves two-step estimation. In the first step, a binary probit 
equation is estimated of choice of school-type (private or public). The parameters of 
this equation are used to estimate the predicted probability of attending private school. 
The researcher then calculates the Inverse Mills Ratio which is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the predicted probability of attending private school.  In the 
second step, the achievement equation is estimated on the private school students‟ 
sub-sample, with the Mills Ratio as an extra term.  Similarly, a separate selectivity-
corrected achievement equation is fitted on the public school students‟ sub-sample. 
Finally, one can use the fitted private school achievement equation to predict the 
achievement score of the average student – with the mean characteristics of all 
students in the population as a whole – if he/she were to attend a private school and 
predict another achievement score for this same average student if he/she were to 
attend a public school, and examine whether this average student‟s score was higher 
in the private or the public sector. 
 
The Heckman approach was used to the estimate the relative effectiveness of private 
and public schools in  (Jiminez, Lockheed and Paqueo, 1991) and (Kingdon, 1996). 
Kingdon (1996) extends the more standard binary probit equation of school type 
choice (as between private and public school)  into a multinomial logit model that 
allows choice between three different school types (private, aided, and government). 
The paper finds evidence of selection into private schooling, and presents estimates of 
the „relative advantage‟ of private schooling that are lower than those from OLS.  The 
advantage for private aided schools (over government schools) is eliminated, while 
the estimate of the private unaided school „effect‟ is greatly reduced. 
 
2.3.4  Selection on Unobservables 
In the classical linear regression model adding additional variables to the equation 
reduces endogeneity by controlling for previously unobserved variables. Yet under 
any specification there are still unobserved characteristics. A method proposed by 
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) complements OLS by estimating the potential effect 
of remaining unobservables in such a model, by estimating how much greater the 
effect of unobservables would need to be relative to the observables, to eliminate the 
whole of the private school effect. 
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The method is based on the condition that if  “the relationship between private 
schooling and the mean of the distribution of the index of the unobservables that 
determine outcomes is the same as the relationship between P and the mean of the 
observable index after adjusting for differences in the variances of these distributions.” 
(Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005p. 13) as shown in equation 4. Put simply this means 
then the relationship between the indices of unobservables shown on the LHS of the 




𝐸 ? 𝑃 = 1  − 𝐸 ? 𝑃 = 0 
??𝑟(?)
=
𝐸 ?′? 𝑃 = 1  − 𝐸 ?′? 𝑃 = 0 
??𝑟(?)
  (4) 
 
 
There are three assumptions. Firstly, that the observed variables are a random 
selection from the full set of variables (both observed and unobserved) that affect 
cognitive outcomes. Second, the number of variables in both the observed and full set 
of variables are large. Finally that there is not any one variable that dominates the 
outcome effect. (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005)   
 
Given these assumptions we can compute how large the omitted variables bias must 
be to make our results invalid (i.e. to cast the whole of the private school effect as 
being due to the unobservables). The question posed is „how large would the ratio on 
the LHS of equation 4 have to be relative to the ratio on the RHS to account for the 
entire estimate of the private school effects under the null hypothesis that the private 
school effect is zero.‟  
 
The original paper to demonstrate this method was by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005),   
it estimated the „implied ratio‟ for identifying a catholic school effect. (Goyal, 2008) 
is the only application of this method to estimating the private schooling effect in 
India. This paper suggests the implied ratio if 9.81 for reading and 9.76 for maths. 
That is, the effect of unobserved factors on student achievement would have to be 
nearly 10 times as large as the effect of the observed factors, for the whole of the 
private school effect to be due to unobserved factors. This is unlikely. Thus one is 
confident that the private school effect cannot be attributed wholly to unobservables, 
and can conclude that some of the private school effect is a real causal effect.  
 
2.3.5  Panel Data Approach  
Longitudinal data provides repeated observations of the same individuals over time. 
As a result, one can take advantage of the multiple measures for each individual and 
net out time-invariant individual characteristics.  By netting out both observed and 
unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time, one is able to control for 
variables that would otherwise be correlated with both private school participation 
and cognitive achievement. There are two principal methods for panel data, either 
fixed effects estimation or random effects estimation.   
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The fixed effects estimator controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The 
time invariant characteristics drop out because they have no bearing on any temporal 
change in the outcome. For example gender will be the same in all periods and is thus 
not part of the model, one is already controlling for all observed (and time-invariant 
unobserved) characteristics of an individual.  In simple terms one might imagine this 
as a idiosyncratic dummy  ?𝑖, shifting the equation of interest up or down by some 
individual specific amount, the model can be specified with 𝑖 (individual) and t (time  
period) subscripts as in equation 5. 
 
  𝑦𝑖? = ? + ?𝑖 + ?𝑃𝑖? + ??𝑖? + ??  (5) 
 
More correctly (but mathematically equivalently) this is a deviation from the  
mean dependent and independent variables, shown in equation 6. 
 
  (𝑦𝑖? − 𝑦𝑖  ) = ?(𝑃𝑖? − 𝑃 𝑖  ) + ?(?𝑖? − ?𝑖  ) + (?𝑖?−?𝑖)  (6) 
 
The traditional intercept term is now eliminated (the constant is determined by the 
individual level deviation) and time-varying unobservables now are the only 
unobservables that still remain in the error term. For instance, if ability does not 
change over time, it will be netted out in an individual fixed effects model. But if 
ability changes over time, the portion of ability that changes over time will still 
remain in the error term. 
 
This method is not particularly helpful in estimating the private school „effect‟ since 
typically few students change school-type mid-way through their school career.  In 
any case, longitudinal data on achievement levels and school and teacher inputs etc. 
for a set of children – even when they change schools – is not usually available for 
most countries. 
 
A random effect model is a special case of fixed effects, making the additional 
assumption that the individual effects are randomly distributed, drawn from some 
specified distribution.  In this model the error term is split into the error term: ?𝑖? and 
the random effects  ?𝑖 shown in equation 7. The random effects are distributed  
normally, with a mean of zero and constant variance.  
 
  ? 𝑖? = ? + ?𝑃𝑖? + ??𝑖? + ?𝑖 + ?𝑖?  (7) 
 
This approach requires no correlation between the regressors ?𝑖? and the random 
effects ?𝑖. Random effects is more efficient than fixed effects, because it estimates a 
distribution of idiosyncratic effects rather than a different intercept for each individual, 
thus saving degrees of freedom. To benefit from the extra efficiency of the random 
effects model and obtain consistent estimates, one must be sure that the „no 
correlation‟ assumption is satisfied both theoretically and empirically.  Intuitively this 
requires one to justify how relevant unobserved characteristics are not related to the 
relevant observed variables. Empirically, this is tested using a Hausman test. To our 
knowledge there are no examples in the  literature estimating the private school effect 
using longitudinal data.  
 
While the most common use of fixed effects estimation is to control for within 
individual variation in a panel data setting, the same estimation method may be used   14 
to control for heterogeneity between any clusters in the data. In the longitudinal panel 
sense the cluster is the individual; in a cross-sectional sense individuals are clustered 
into households, schools and geographic areas that have heterogeneous effects on the 
outcome of interest which can be netted out using fixed effects estimation.  
 
In practical terms, this approach is particularly promising in estimating a private 
school effect as it requires only cross-section data, which is more commonly available 
than longitudinal data on achievement and inputs.  It is possible to use fixed effects at 
different levels – i.e. at the level of the state, the district, the village and finally, the 
household. Intuitively, estimating a household fixed effects achievement production 
function relates the difference in achievement score of siblings, on the type of school 
(private vs. public) attended by the siblings. Any unobserved characteristics of the 
household that affect achievement – such as parental taste for education and the home 
educational environment – would be netted out across the siblings since they would 
be the same for all children within the household. Of course, it remains possible that 
individual children within the household will differ to some extent in their unobserved 
characteristics (e.g. in terms of ability or ambition etc.) but, in general, a family fixed 
effects method will provide a tighter upper-bound of any private school effect (than 
an OLS method), since it controls for those unobserved individual-level 
characteristics that are shared among members within a household. 
2.3.6  The Methods Used in this Study 
This study uses a variety of techniques to build a picture of the private school effect 
on achievement in India, since no technique on its own has the capacity to yield 
perfectly convincing estimates of the private school effect. This comparative approach 
enables us to examine whether different approaches yield similar conclusions about 
the private school effect in Indian primary schooling.  The randomized trial method is 
not possible as we do not have appropriate data.  Similarly while 2SLS and Heckman 
sample selectivity correction approaches are in principle feasible, we do not have 
convincing identifying variables that could predict private school choice but not 
otherwise affect achievement.  Hence, we start with the private school dummy 
variable approach as the OLS baseline.  We then use cross-section fixed effects 
techniques, using progressively more stringent levels of fixed effects at the level of 
the state, the district, the village and finally household fixed effects.  We supplement 
this with longitudinal data analysis by constructing a village level panel data over 
time and use village and time fixed effects. Finally we use the method suggested by 
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) to examine whether the size of the effect of the 
unobservables could be large enough to explain away the entire private school effect.  
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3  Data  
3.1  The Surveys  
The study uses three years of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) surveys, 
from 2005 to 2007. These surveys were conducted by a group of 776 NGOs and 
institutions under the banner of Pratham, an educational NGO from Mumbai. The 
motivation behind such a comprehensive study was to assess the state of learning and 
school enrolment in India. During this period the annual survey aims to cover about 
400 households in each one of India‟s 580 odd districts, yielding a large national 
dataset of about 330,000 households, with learning achievement tests from over 1.1 
million children aged 6-14.   
 
The 2005 ASER data included a household survey and a separate survey of the main 
government school in the sample villages. The household survey focussed on the 
schooling of the children and tested each child‟s level of ability in maths and reading.  
For the survey of the village government school, measures were taken of school 
attendance and a series of indicators of school quality.  
 
In 2006, there was a household survey but no school survey. The household survey 
collected the same individual-level information as in 2005. Additional information 
was collected in the household survey regarding the mother‟s characteristics, 
including on mother‟s education and reading ability. In 2006 all of the villages 
sampled in 2005 were sampled, and an additional set of villages were sampled, about 
half as many again as in 2005.  
 
In 2007, both a household survey and a school survey were carried out. In the 
household survey there was more extensive testing of children and also data on some 
of the mother‟s characteristics collected in 2006 were also collected again.  The 
survey of the largest government school in the village was more comprehensive than 
in 2005, collecting more information on school quality variables, and looking at some 
characteristics specific to certain grades. In 2007 the „new‟ villages of 2006 were re-
sampled, also half of those sampled in 2005 were re-sampled, the other half being 
replaced by a new sample of villages.  Roughly speaking, if one split the entire 
sample of villages in the three years of the survey into four quarters, each of 
approximately five thousand villages, then one quarter are sampled in both 2005 and 
2006 but then dropped for 2007; another quarter are surveyed in all three years; 
another quarter are not sampled in 2005, but are in 2006 and 2007; and a final quarter 
that are sampled only in 2007. 
3.2  The Sampling Methodology 
All Indian states were included in the sample, and within each state the rural parts of 
all districts were used. The sampling took place at the village and household level. To 
be cost effective Pratham needed a sample size that was sufficiently large to be able to 
draw statistically significant conclusions, yet at the same time minimise costs. 
Pratham calculated that reliable inference required 400 households for each district. 
Ideally these would be drawn as a random sample; however there was no complete list   16 
of households within districts. Instead there was an arbitrary decision to sample 20 
households in 20 villages within each district. The village was randomly selected 
using probability proportional to size for each district. For sampling households 
within each village there were no lists of households to make a random sample. 
Instead the interviewer was asked to use a random sampling method. Each village was 
divided into four sections by the interviewer, in each section the interviewer chose a 
central household for the first survey. They then chose every fifth (in larger villages a 
larger interval was used) household in a circular fashion until they had selected five 
households for that section. This is repeated for each of the four sections yielding 20 
households for each village. The advantage of this approach is that villages in India 
are often divided into separate hamlets and so interviewers may miss households on 
the periphery. By dividing villages into sections it ensures all parts of the village are 
covered. 
3.3  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data 
 The primary strength of the data set is the enormous sample size, with 265,460 
children aged 6-14 in 2005, 433,972 in 2005 and 410,379 in 2007 used in this analysis. 
These samples represent the rural proportion of approximately 200 million school 
aged children for the country as a whole.  In addition to the large number of students 
surveyed, there is data on the quality of thousands of schools providing a clear and 
representative picture of the state of rural schooling in India.  
 
A second strength of the survey is the fact that children were tested at the household 
level. Such an approach is rare because it is much more expensive to test children in 
the home than in a school where there are large numbers of students, well organised 
into ages and ability and with the facilities for testing. This feature allows us to be 
much more confident in our findings as it prevents the bias associated with testing in 
schools from teachers putting their most able students forward. 
 
Though the data contain important control variables, a concern with making inference 
on any data set is that many variables that are important to achievement are omitted 
from the data. Firstly, income data or a socio economic status measure would have 
allowed us to distinguish any private school effect from the effect of family affluence. 
Unfortunately, such information was not collected. Secondly, data on the motivation, 
natural ability or prior achievement of the student would allow us to make more 
confident statements about any private school effect because these unobserved traits 
may be correlated with the private school choice (e.g. it may be that the more 
motivated children, e.g. from more motivated and educationally-oriented families go 
to private schools).  The final variable that would have been useful is the caste and 
religion of the child, as these are major sources of discrimination in India and it would 
be important to see how this impacts on student achievement. 
 
However, we will use econometric techniques that enable us to overcome these data 
deficiencies, at least to a large extent. For example, household fixed effects estimation 
will do away with the disadvantage of not having data on household income, SES, 
caste, religion etc. since these remain the same for all siblings within the household. 
Even the effect of unobserved traits such as motivation and ability are likely to be 
lower in a family fixed effects equation than in a simple OLS equation since   17 
motivation and ability are often genetically passed on from parent to child and are 
shared within the family, at least to some extent. 
3.4  Regression Variables  
Achievement was measured using tests of the students in both maths and language, 
and assigned a level of up to three or four respectively, as shown in Table 1. For the 
analysis, a single outcome measure was made by adding the maths and language 
scores. This was standardised within each year by first taking a child‟s achievement 
score, subtracting the mean achievement score of all students in that year and then 
dividing by the standard deviation of achievement for that year.  Thus we work with 
the z-score of achievement mark rather than with absolute achievement mark. 
 
Table 1  
Cognitive outcomes       
Language  Mark  Maths  Mark 
Could do nothing   0  Could do nothing in maths  0 
Could read letters  1  Could recognise two digit numbers
a  1 
Could read words  2  Could do two-digit subtraction  2 
Could read a paragraph  3  Could do three by one digit division  3 
Could read a story  4     
a  „Could recognise numbers 1 to 9‟ was added in 2007. For our analysis, we 
have included this with „could do nothing in maths‟. 
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Figure 1 presents the mean maths, reading and total cognitive achievement mark in 
each year (the outcomes were converted to percentages to aid comparison). The scale 
of the graph was chosen to exaggerate the differences between years. Reading mark 
shows a small but consistent growth rate over time whereas Maths achievement 
fluctuates, with a large jump in 2006 and the 2007 estimate slightly below the 2005 
estimate. It is possible that the reason that maths achievement fell in 2007 was 
because the maths test changed slightly in that year‟s survey. In 2007 an additional 
category was added of whether the child could recognise single digit numbers, this 
fell between „being able to do nothing in maths‟ and „being able to recognise 2 digit 
numbers‟. For the purposes of our analysis this category was recoded with „being able 
to do nothing‟ but it is possible that the presence of the this extra intermediate level 







The independent variables were organised into three levels:  the child level, the 
household level, and regional level. Individual child characteristics include child‟s 
gender, age and current schooling. At the household level there is the household size 
in every year and there were additional characteristics regarding the mother in the 
2006 and 2007 surveys. This included the mother‟s age, the highest schooling 
obtained (i.e. highest grade completed) by the mother and also a test of whether the 
mother was able to read. At the regional level the village, the district and the state in 
which the child lives were recorded.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression are presented in Table 
3 and 4. The first table summarises the individual child level data, with columns for 
the mean and standard deviation of each variable for every year; in the following table 
this sequence is repeated for the aggregated village level data. The mean and SD of 
the achievement z-score are 0 and 1 (by construction) in each of the three years.  
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In the survey the school type was recorded into five categories, government, private, 
EGS/AEI (Education Guarantee Scheme / Alternative Education Institution); Madrasa 
and out of school. The primary concern of this paper was to distinguish between the 
government and private school. EGS/AEI were included with government schooling 
as these are simply special types of government school, these represent only 0.66 of 
one percent of the sample. Madrasa was not included because this is a religious rather 
than an academic type of schooling and as such the decision will be driven by 
religious preferences rather than the school quality differences that we are trying to 
isolate. Those who were out of school were also dropped from the analysis because 
such children are most likely engaged in other activities and so the schooling choice 
becomes irrelevant. Dropping the Madrasa and out of school children should not 
affect our results unduly because they represent such small part of the population, 
only 0.7 and 5.65 percentage points respectively. While removing about 6 percent of 
the sample could cause our achievement production function to suffer from sample 
selectivity bias, we have not dealt with this potential econometric problem for two 
reasons.  Firstly, with such a small proportion of 0s (94% being 1s), it would be 
difficult to properly identify a first stage binary probit equation of enrolment choice. 
Secondly, even if these were not issues, we do not have any convincing identifying 
variables with which to identify the selectivity term lambda, i.e. there are no variables 
that affect enrolment choice but do not plausibly also affect the achievement outcome. 
It seems unlikely that the small percentage of excluded children will be a major 
source of sample selectivity bias in identifying the private school effect. 
 
Table 3 and 4 show that the sex ratio in the 6-14 age population is an alarmingly low 
0.45 across the three years, lending support to Amartya Sen‟s (1992) „missing women‟ 
hypothesis which suggests widespread male-child preference on the part of parents. 
Whether such pro-male gender bias in education manifests itself in lower learning 
achievement of girls is revealed in the regression analysis.  
 
At the household level the mother‟s schooling and literacy prove to be the most 
important. The proportion of the mothers that never received any formal schooling is 
fairly high at over fifty percent. Unsurprisingly this is correlated with whether the 
mother can read and again this represents more than half of the population.  
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4  Results 
This section discusses findings from the four methods which were used to estimate 
the private school effect. Cross-sectional OLS regression as a baseline; state, district, 
village and household fixed effects to control for heterogeneity at each cluster level; 
longitudinal analysis to net out time-invariant heterogeneity; and finally estimating 
the effect of unobservables relative to the private school effect.  
 
The full regression results are presented together in the appendix. Rather than always 
quote results from each year, the estimate from the pooled regression was used as a 
summary for the cross-sectional analysis, with the intention that the reader could 
cross-reference with the year specific results in the appendix. 
4.1  Cross-Sectional Analysis 
A  simple  OLS  cross-section  regression  is  summarised  by  equation  8,  here  the 
outcome measure 𝑦 is the standardised achievement score. The independent variable 
𝑃 is the private school dummy and ? is a vector of the control variables.  
 
  𝑦 = ? + ?𝑃 + ?? + ?  (8) 
 
 
Table 5, 6, 7 and 8 present cross-section regressions of the achievement production 
function for years 2005, 2006, 2007 and pooled respectively.  The controls used were 
the gender and age of the child. Age was treated as a categorical variable because the 
age profile followed a complex pattern and the large sample size meant that saving 
degrees of freedom was not a concern. The full estimates from this specification are 
shown in the first column of Table 5 to 8.  
 
First we take a brief look at results other than on the private school dummy variable. 
All variables are very precisely determined, due to our large sample sizes. In 2005, 
girls‟ achievement was about 0.038 SD lower than boys‟ but in 2006 this falls to 
0.025 SD and further to 0.016 SD in 2007, suggesting an equalising trend in 
achievement levels. However, less benignly, the gender gap in achievement continues 
to exist even in the household fixed effects equation in the last column of each table, 
which suggests that the gender gap in achievement is an intra-household phenomenon.  
 
Achievement increases monotonically with age: It increases by about 0.35 SD per 
year between ages 6 and 9 but then increases progressively more slowly each year 
after that. However this trend may be due to the test being designed to evaluate 
competencies more appropriate to the early grades and thus not able to show advances 
beyond basic arithmetic and reading a story.   
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Turning to the variable of most interest, the estimate of the private school effect was 
0.247 in 2005, 0.201 in 2006, 0.246 in 2007 and 0.228 in the pooled data. That is, 
after controlling for age and gender, private school attendees have cognitive 
achievement between 0.20 and 0.25 standard deviations (SD) higher than government 
school attendees. This is about seven times the effect of gender, and almost equal to 
the effect of an extra year of education, on average over the age range 6-14.  
 
The OLS estimates provide the „upper bound‟ for the private school effect; one can 
refine the OLS estimates by using a cluster level fixed effect, to control for both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity between clusters.  We estimate equation 9, 
where the 𝑖 subscript denotes the cluster and the ? subscript the individual within that 
cluster.  
 
   (𝑦𝑖? − 𝑦𝑖  ) = ?(𝑃𝑖? − 𝑃 𝑖  ) + ?(?𝑖? − ?𝑖  ) + (?𝑖?−?𝑖)  (9) 
 
In the data we have four potential levels of clustering: the state, the district, the village 
and  the  household.  This  allows  us  to  control  for  observable  and  unobservable 
differences between the different clusters and thus produce more accurate estimates of 
the effects of the independent variables.   It also allows us to see how the private 
school  effect  changes  when  we  use  progres sively  lower  and  lower  levels  of 
geographical aggregation as our clustering variable: state, then district, then village, 
then  household.  As  one  moves  to  a  more  localised  level  of  fixed  effects,  one  is 
eliminating the differences due to the location of the individual and thus one can see 
which independent variable effects are consistent at all levels and those for which the 
regional effects formed some part of the estimate. 
 
In India, some of the states are larger than most countries of the world. Thus to net out 
unobserved differences between these states allows one to control for both the 
observed differences in education policies but also the more subtle unobserved or 
unmeasured differences between states. Using state fixed effects, the estimate for the 
private school effect is 0.281 SD in 2005, 0.245 SD in 2006, 0.257 SD in 2006 and 
0.255 SD in the pooled data. The effect size is statistically significantly larger than the 
OLS estimate in all specifications and years but economically it is not all that larger.  
  
The Indian districts, like the states, comprise vast areas and as such the district fixed 
effect is able to control for the social, political and geographic differences between 
these regions. The district fixed effects results do not change much from the state 
fixed effects results, with an estimate of the private school effect of 0.286 SD in 2005, 
0.225 SD in 2006, 0.246 SD in 2007 and 0.241 SD in the pooled data, though these 
estimates are still somewhat above the OLS estimates. 
 
Using a village level fixed effect one finally begins to control for the observed and 
unobserved difference at a level that really affects the everyday lives of the 
individuals in the survey. Including village fixed effects allows us to control for 
observables that affect achievement such as school quality, as well as less easily 
measured variables such as level of motivation and organisation within schools. A 
separate study (French, 2008) using the same data showed that the quality of the local 
government school had an effect on private school attendance and cognitive outcomes. 
Because school quality was only measured for government schools in the sample   22 
villages, the quality measures would be hard to interpret in the context of comparing 
government and private school attainment. By using village fixed effects one is 
effectively controlling for both government school and private school quality at the 
village level (though this effect is not quantified). The estimates of the private 
schooling effect using village level fixed effects was 0.273 in 2005, 0.217 in 2006, 
0.240 in 2007 and 0.227 for the pooled data. These estimates are similar in magnitude 
to those from the plain OLS regression at the village level.  
 
The household fixed effects are the most interesting and important of the cluster level 
fixed effects estimates. The strength of the statements one is able to make using such 
an approach rests on two assumptions. The first, that household level observables and 
unobservables such as parents‟ income and motivation have been controlled for and 
have equal effects for each child. Second, siblings within a household have equal 
unobserved characteristics such as ability and motivation. If these assumption hold the 
estimates of the private school effect using household fixed effects may be interpreted 
as though it was the same child attending different types of school and thus a true 
measure of the relative effectiveness of private and government schools.  
 
While it is intuitive to argue that by using household fixed effects one controls for 
observable and unobservable parental factors, it is harder to justify the assumption 
that the children within a family have equal ability. School choice is not random and 
the fact that a parent has distinguished between the children by sending them to 
alternative schools suggests that there are differences (possibly in ability) between the 
children. Nevertheless, it is the case that on average an individual is more likely to be 
similar to their siblings than to a  random other individual. To the extent that this is 
true, household fixed effects estimation provides a tighter upper bound of the true 
private school effect. 
 
The household fixed effects estimate of the private school effect was 0.207 in 2005, 
0.165 in 2006, 0.180 in 2007 and 0.180 using the pooled data for 2005 to 2007. In 
each sweep the household fixed effect is substantially below the OLS estimate, 
showing that this specification eliminates a large proportion of the previously 
unrevealed bias. This is the most stringent specification of the fixed effects analysis 
and shows that even when one has controlled for everything within the home there is 
still a large and significant private school advantage. These estimates compare with 
the household fixed effects estimates from Desai et al.(2008), which also used a 
national household survey from India but a much smaller one, with about 11,000 
observations. Using the same controls as in this study they found household fixed 
effects estimates of the private school effect of 0.224 standard deviations for 
arithmetic skills and 0.307 for reading skills. 
 
In 2006 and 2007 mother‟s characteristics were measured in the survey. These have 
been used in a separate set of regressions in Table 9. In both of these years the 
mother‟s age and the highest grade she achieved were included, in addition the 
squares of these values were used to capture the non-linear effect of these variables. 
The effect of private schooling was equal to about six years of mother‟s schooling. 
Clearly mother‟s age and education level are correlated with both private schooling 
and child cognitive achievement which is why their inclusion reduces the private 
school effect. For example the private school effect using village effects and the more 
parsimonious specification was 0.217 in 2006 (Table 6) and 0.240 in 2007 (Table 7).    23 
Comparing these estimates with the equivalent specification but including the 
mother‟s characteristics reduced the estimate of the private school effect to 0.186 in 
2006 and 0.208 in 2007. 
 
In 2006 there was additional information from a test of whether the mother could read. 
This provided an interesting contrast to the specification using mere „level of 
schooling‟. Adding this to the regression proved to be more important that mother‟s 
age and schooling level. The effect of mother being able to read on child achievement 
was 0.057 SD, equivalent to about four years of mother‟s primary schooling, however 
when comparing mothers with higher levels of education the effect of being able to 
read fell to less than two years. Adding whether the mother could read had no effect 
on the private school effect estimate.   
4.2  Longitudinal Analysis 
4.2.1  Creating a Pseudo-Panel at the Village Level  
The ASER data does not follow individuals over time and hence we are not able to 
make a longitudinal analysis at that level. The villages used in the survey in 2005 
were included in subsequent waves and so one is able to construct a village level 
panel by averaging individual level variables within the village. Each village became 
a single observation in the dataset, with one, two or three years‟ worth of data on it, 
depending on how many years of the survey it was included in.  
 
The cognitive outcome measure for each village was the village mean of the 
„standardised achievement‟ used in the individual level analysis. While for each year 
the individual-level z-scores have a mean of zero and a year specific standard 
deviation of 1, when we take village-level mean of the z-scores of all 6-14 year olds 
in the sample village, the village mean of z-scores need not be zero. Similarly, the 
village level standard deviation is no longer equal to 1. In a longitudinal context this 
de-meaning of each year‟s sample takes away any trend in the data caused by a 
change in the overall scores for each year. Despite the de-meaning in terms of the 
outcome it was still important to use a dummy for each of the years to pick up the 
effect of any changes between the years, and indeed each of these year dummies 
proved significant, hinting that there are unobserved time variant factors that are 
affecting cognitive achievement but that are unobserved in the data.  
 
The nature of the independent variables has also changed in the village panel. Where 
a variable was previously an individual child-level dummy variable, it would now be 
the proportion of 1s (mean of the 0/1 dummy variable) within the village, while 
continuous variables would now take the village mean. For example, where as in 
individual level analysis up to now, the variable „female‟ took the value of 0 or 1, in 
the village-level panel data analysis, the variable „female‟ represents the proportion of 
female children in the village. To aid comparison between the individual level cross-
sectional analysis and village level longitudinal analysis, the following section 
contains the intermediate case of village-level cross-sectional analysis first.    24 
4.2.2  Village Level Cross-Section  
The results from the village level cross-sectional analysis are presented in Table 10. 
Before discussing the private school effect, we briefly show how the effects of age 
and gender at the village level support those found in the individual analysis. The 
estimate for the effect of gender in the pooled data suggests that in a village with all 
female children compared to a village with all male children mean village cognitive 
achievement is not significantly different from zero in all years in Table 10. As with 
the individual data, we see a trend of reducing gender bias, from -0.0315 SD in 2005, 
to -0.217 SD in 2006 and 0.0128 SD in 2007, but because these are not statistically 
significant, one can make no inference. When we add mother‟s characteristics, the 
gender bias becomes larger and statistically significant. The results with and without 
mothers characteristics tell us that the explanation for the gender bias effect (and the 
effect of mother quality) is different at the village level than at the individual level. At 
the village level the proportion of girls in the sample may increase when more girls go 
to school and hence are included in the sample for this analysis. The level of „mother 
quality‟ at the village level may be more related to the degree of socialisation and 
development of the village, rather than having a direct effect on children‟s cognitive 
outcomes that we found at the individual level.   
 
The effect of age is more consistent with the individual level analysis, with 
achievement increasing monotonically with age. It increases by an average of 0.4 SD 
between the ages of six and nine then grows much more slowly at 0.1 SD per year 
between nine and fourteen.  
 
The village level results also reinforce the finding of a private school achievement 
advantage found in the individual level analysis. The beta values show the effect of a 
change in the private school attendance from none to all children in the village, on 
village mean standardised achievement; this is 0.199 SD in 2005, 0.219 SD in 2006, 
0.289 SD in 2007 and 0.242 SD in the pooled data. There appears to be a slight 
positive trend, though one should be cautious about interpreting a trend from three 
years data, especially given that we found no trend under alternative specifications.  
 
In 2006 and 2007 we are able to include mother‟s characteristics and these results are 
presented in Table 11. They show that the relationship between mother‟s education 
(M grade) and student achievement changes somewhat from that at the individual 
level. The inclusion of maternal education and literacy variables in 2006 causes the 
estimate of the private school effect to fall to 0.0549 (or 0.0353 if one includes 
„mother can read‟).  In 2007 the private school effect falls to 0.141, not as large a fall 
as in 2006 but still a significant drop compared to that found in individual level 
analysis.   
 
The reason that adding mother quality causes the private school effect to fall more in 
the village level analysis than in the individual child level analysis is due to changes 
in the nature of the data. In averaging the data at the village level the mother‟s quality 
changes from being an individual level variable whose main effect would be on their 
child‟s cognitive outcomes to a village level measure of mothers‟ education that will 
still affect child‟s cognitive outcomes but may also cause an increase in the 
probability of private schooling by signalling a demand for a private school.  
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The reason for the stronger effect of mother‟s education and literacy in village level 
than in individual-level regressions can be understood from Table 2. Table 2 show the 
correlation between the „mother quality‟ variables and private schooling. The 
correlation with mother‟s age is low and does not change much; this variable makes 
little difference to the private school effect when added to the regression. However the 
correlation between education and literacy increases by half as much again, when the 
data is averaged at the village level. This suggests that at the village level while 
mother‟s quality still affects child‟s cognitive outcomes directly, it also has a greater 
effect on the propensity to attend private schooling. Thus there may be selection of 
private schooling into villages where mothers are more educated. 
 
Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients between the Private School Variable and Mother’s 
Characteristics in the Individual Data and the Village Level Data 
 
Correlation With Private Schooling 
 
Individual Data  Village Data 
Mother's age  -0.0102  0.0477 
Mother's Highest Grade  0.1919  0.2927 
Whether Mother Can Read  0.1364  0.2002 
   
4.2.3  Village Level Panel 
While the panel data equations could be estimated using fixed effects or random 
effects, the more efficient random effects were rejected for three reasons. Firstly the 
distribution of village effects does not have a useful interpretation and is of little 
relevance. Second, it is hard to justify the assumption that private schooling is 
exogenous, because the objective of private schooling is to improve cognitive 
outcomes and making such a choice is related to many factors that are not observed in 
this survey.  Finally, there is a clear empirical rejection of random effects comparing 
models and using the Hausman test. 
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Using village and time fixed effects with village level panel data (last column of 
Table 10), we estimate that a village moving from zero to one hundred percent private 
school attendance will result in a 0.190 SD increase in village mean attainment. This 
is similar to the effect found in individual child-level data, in the household fixed 
effects analysis, in Table 5 to 8. To put this in a more realistic context, if private 
schooling increases in a village by two standard deviations – say from 1 SD below  its 
mean level to 1 SD above it (i.e. by about 49%, see Table 4), this would be associated 
with a 0.09 SD increase in mean achievement of children in the village.  
 
The longitudinal private school effect estimate of 0.190 SD (Table 10) is smaller than 
those found in the cross-sectional analysis. Approximately four fifths of the individual 
child level estimate of 0.227 (using the pooled village fixed effects estimates from 
Table 8) and four fifths of the village-level estimate of 0.242 (using the pooled 
estimates from Table 10).  This longitudinal approach allows one to find the effect of 
a change in private schooling over time on change in achievement over time, while 
controlling for all of the time-invariant unobserved village level characteristics that 
are associated with private school choice and cognitive achievement which biased the 
cross-sectional estimates.  
 
Having mother‟s characteristics for two years permits the construction of a two year 
village panel (Table 11). As one would expect, including mothers characteristics and a 
panel approach leads to the lowest estimate of the private school effect of 0.114. This 
is lower for three reasons. Firstly because adding mother quality eliminates the effect 
of the mother quality omitted variable bias; second because of the bias associated with 
the increase in the correlation between mother quality (as shown in Table 2) and 
finally the longitudinal analysis examines only the effect of temporal changes within 
the same village so controls for village level unobservables in a more stringent way 
than a cross-sectional village fixed effect. It is remarkable that with just one year of 
change one is still able to identify an economically sizeable and statistically 
significant private school effect. 
4.3  Selection on Unobservables 
The Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) method was applied to a number of specifications 
for the cognitive achievement model, but only the most stringent is reported here. 
This uses the fullest specification possible, including age, gender, school type and the 
mother‟s age, the highest grade that the mother achieved and whether the mother 
could read. These mother‟s characteristics are available only in the 2006 data, so this 
is the sample used.  The estimates are calculated using village fixed effects and are 
presented in Table 12. 
 
In this specification the implied ratio is 5.29.  This means the effect of unobservables 
must be more than five times that of the observables to eliminate the entire private 
school effect. This suggests that there is a positive and highly statistical effect of 
private schooling that is unlikely to be wholly the result of selection on unobservables. 
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5  Conclusions 
This paper used the ASER data in attempting to estimate the „true‟ effect of private 
schooling on children‟s cognitive by using a series of approaches to deal with the 
endogenous nature of the private school choice. There is consistent evidence of a 
private schooling advantage throughout the methodologies. Our best estimate of the 
private school effect from individual child level cross-section data is from our 
household fixed effects method. This yields a private school effect on child 
achievement of about 0.17 SD. Using village level panel data including mother 
quality and the longitudinal methodology, there is a still a sizeable private school 
effect of 0.114 SD. All of the methodologies listed attempted to control for the level 
of unobservables, the method of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) showed that the 
whole private school effect is unlikely to be explained by unobservables. 
 
 
The limitation of any study of private schooling is the extent to which one is able to 
control for the endogeneity of the school choice. The potential to deal with this issue 
depends on the quality and nature of the data. There is a shortage of data on 
developing countries, it is expensive to collect and depends on an infrastructure that is 
not necessarily in place. By choosing such an ambitious target as producing a 
representative dataset of rural India, the survey compromised on richness of variables 
in order to make the enormous sample size feasible. Further data on the individuals, 
such as a measure of innate ability and further data on households, particularly 
income would strengthen estimation. However the methodologies used here to tackle 
the effects of endogeneity makes one confident that the private school advantage is 
„real‟. This implies that there is a shortfall in the government schooling output that 
may be reduced by adapting some of the processes used within the private sector.  
 
One could build upon the existing analysis by regressing different outcomes or 
separate estimates for different groups. Finding the private school effect for maths and 
reading scores separately to find if the private school impact is different for these 
subjects. One could also estimate the effects for primary and secondary aged children 
separately as the primary and upper-primary school level issues are likely to be 
different.  Estimating the private school effect for boys and girls would be particularly 
interesting, in the cross sectional estimates this paper shows the gender bias reduces 
substantially, from -0.0401 standard deviations in 2006, to -0.0241 in 2006 and to -
0.0235 in 2007. For the gender bias to reduce by almost half in only three years is a 
substantial achievement and separate estimations may reveal the different effects of 
private schooling between genders. Finally, it would be useful to do the analysis by 
state since educational policies of the various states differ in India and this may 
impinge on the relative effectiveness of private and government schools in the 
different states. These are useful research agendas for the future. 
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7  Appendix 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables across Each Year at the Individual Level 
 
2005  2006  2007 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Score  0  1  0  1  0  1 
Female  0.445  0.497  0.450  0.497  0.455  0.498 
Age  9.739  2.424  9.942  2.508  9.835  2.443 
Private  0.174  0.379  0.215  0.411  0.206  0.404 
HH size  6.787  3.037  7.198  3.363  6.429  2.622 
Mother age 
   
34.948  7.991  33.544  5.807 
Mother age
2 
   
1285.248  662.755  1158.904  422.179 
Mother grade  
   
3.164  4.063  3.231  4.067 
Mother grade
2 
   
26.512  41.420  26.979  41.238 
Mother read 
   
0.369  0.482 




Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables Across Each Year at the Village Level
a 
 
2005  2006  2007 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Score  0.007  0.491  0.016  0.494  -0.001  0.503 
Female  0.445  0.128  0.453  0.139  0.455  0.134 
Age  9.745  0.855  9.978  0.784  9.839  0.811 
Private  0.171  0.228  0.216  0.245  0.205  0.242 
HH size   6.629  1.834  6.839  2.018  6.257  1.534 
Mother age 
   
34.785  3.881  33.392  3.087 
Mother age
2 
   
1275.305  315.784  1149.077  223.062 
Mother grade  
   
3.349  2.525  3.386  2.586 
Mother grade
2 
   
28.323  25.600  28.410  26.086 
Mother read 
   
0.489  0.315 
    Observations  9037  15616  14895 
a The mean „Score‟ here is the average (across villages) of the village-level mean of individual 
children‟s achievement z-scores. i.e. first we calculated the mean of the achievement z-scores of 
individual children within a village, and then have taken the mean of that village level achievement 
variable. That is why the mean and SD of the achievement z-score here are not equal to 0 and 1 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
2005 Cross-Sectional Regression of Cognitive Achievement Using Fixed Effects Estimation  
  No FE  State FE  District FE  Village FE  HH FE 
Female  -0.0379***  -0.0411***  -0.0381***  -0.0370***  -0.0401*** 
  (0.00365)  (0.0147)  (0.00444)  (0.00303)  (0.00304) 
Age 7  0.398***  0.400***  0.401***  0.402***  0.400*** 
  (0.00780)  (0.0150)  (0.00950)  (0.00667)  (0.00643) 
Age 8  0.745***  0.750***  0.755***  0.763***  0.775*** 
  (0.00762)  (0.0259)  (0.0107)  (0.00680)  (0.00604) 
Age 9  1.098***  1.098***  1.095***  1.099***  1.105*** 
  (0.00873)  (0.0280)  (0.0130)  (0.00755)  (0.00655) 
Age 10  1.342***  1.349***  1.356***  1.365***  1.381*** 
  (0.00838)  (0.0268)  (0.0133)  (0.00748)  (0.00625) 
Age 11  1.557***  1.560***  1.571***  1.583***  1.599*** 
  (0.00909)  (0.0268)  (0.0145)  (0.00791)  (0.00685) 
Age 12  1.680***  1.683***  1.694***  1.708***  1.725*** 
  (0.00859)  (0.0245)  (0.0149)  (0.00777)  (0.00657) 
Age 13  1.796***  1.800***  1.813***  1.827***  1.836*** 
  (0.00907)  (0.0265)  (0.0153)  (0.00825)  (0.00714) 
Age 14  1.882***  1.890***  1.900***  1.912***  1.923*** 
  (0.00897)  (0.0331)  (0.0163)  (0.00847)  (0.00727) 
Private  0.247***  0.281***  0.286***  0.273***  0.207*** 
  (0.00806)  (0.0438)  (0.0127)  (0.00702)  (0.00700) 
HH size  -0.0104***  -0.00435**  -0.00311***  0.000404   
  (0.00118)  (0.00198)  (0.00118)  (0.000719)   
Constant  -1.078***  -1.127***  -1.144***  -1.174***  -1.168*** 
  (0.0108)  (0.0237)  (0.0135)  (0.00751)  (0.00487) 
R
2  0.372  0.380  0.402  0.440  0.471 
Observations  265460  265460  265460  265460  265460 
States    28       
Districts      486     
Villages        9037   
Households          78321 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 6 
2006  Cross-Sectional Regression of Cognitive Achievement Using Fixed Effects Estimation  
   No FE  State FE  District FE  Village FE  HH FE 
Female  -0.0248***  -0.0232**  -0.0235***  -0.0233***  -0.0242*** 
  (0.00275)  (0.0107)  (0.00344)  (0.00220)  (0.00225) 
Age 7  0.365***  0.360***  0.360***  0.364***  0.375*** 
  (0.00596)  (0.0143)  (0.00735)  (0.00503)  (0.00505) 
Age 8  0.721***  0.718***  0.719***  0.722***  0.739*** 
  (0.00570)  (0.0215)  (0.00881)  (0.00495)  (0.00459) 
Age 9  1.067***  1.059***  1.061***  1.061***  1.079*** 
  (0.00685)  (0.0211)  (0.0112)  (0.00578)  (0.00512) 
Age 10  1.335***  1.332***  1.331***  1.335***  1.362*** 
  (0.00624)  (0.0260)  (0.0114)  (0.00548)  (0.00473) 
Age 11  1.572***  1.567***  1.567***  1.569***  1.591*** 
  (0.00676)  (0.0253)  (0.0116)  (0.00584)  (0.00516) 
Age 12  1.698***  1.696***  1.696***  1.699***  1.729*** 
  (0.00612)  (0.0251)  (0.0113)  (0.00554)  (0.00479) 
Age 13  1.835***  1.835***  1.832***  1.829***  1.854*** 
  (0.00627)  (0.0340)  (0.0119)  (0.00567)  (0.00507) 
Age 14  1.924***  1.919***  1.915***  1.913***  1.942*** 
  (0.00613)  (0.0413)  (0.0122)  (0.00571)  (0.00505) 
Private  0.201***  0.245***  0.225***  0.217***  0.165*** 
  (0.00574)  (0.0392)  (0.00903)  (0.00450)  (0.00447) 
HH size  -0.0120***  -0.00465***  -0.00377***  -0.000714   
  (0.000837)  (0.00153)  (0.000848)  (0.000539)   
Constant  -1.108***  -1.167***  -1.169***  -1.191***  -1.204*** 
  (0.00813)  (0.0196)  (0.0111)  (0.00576)  (0.00374) 
R
2  0.402  0.414  0.431  0.472  0.515 
Observations  433972  433972  433972  433972  433972 
States    31       
Districts      555     
Villages        15616   
Households          127139 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 7 
2007  Cross-Sectional Regression of Cognitive Achievement Using Fixed Effects Estimation  
   No FE  State  District FE  Village FE  HH FE 
Female  -0.0164***  -0.0206  -0.0200***  -0.0218***  -0.0235*** 
  (0.00277)  (0.0123)  (0.00339)  (0.00221)  (0.00225) 
Age 7  0.364***  0.365***  0.363***  0.362***  0.367*** 
  (0.00579)  (0.0160)  (0.00741)  (0.00508)  (0.00501) 
Age 8  0.736***  0.741***  0.736***  0.739***  0.752*** 
  (0.00581)  (0.0269)  (0.00946)  (0.00515)  (0.00464) 
Age 9  1.106***  1.109***  1.101***  1.099***  1.113*** 
  (0.00686)  (0.0287)  (0.0120)  (0.00593)  (0.00512) 
Age 10  1.385***  1.388***  1.383***  1.391***  1.416*** 
  (0.00646)  (0.0335)  (0.0123)  (0.00580)  (0.00483) 
Age 11  1.620***  1.624***  1.620***  1.628***  1.652*** 
  (0.00678)  (0.0279)  (0.0123)  (0.00600)  (0.00521) 
Age 12  1.743***  1.746***  1.744***  1.755***  1.782*** 
  (0.00629)  (0.0260)  (0.0121)  (0.00579)  (0.00496) 
Age 13  1.877***  1.881***  1.877***  1.886***  1.910*** 
  (0.00644)  (0.0279)  (0.0121)  (0.00590)  (0.00525) 
Age 14  1.965***  1.964***  1.963***  1.970***  1.986*** 
  (0.00632)  (0.0288)  (0.0124)  (0.00604)  (0.00537) 
Private  0.246***  0.257***  0.246***  0.240***  0.180*** 
  (0.00608)  (0.0390)  (0.00983)  (0.00469)  (0.00456) 
HH size  -0.0110***  -0.00188  -0.000504  0.00231***   
  (0.00108)  (0.00216)  (0.00113)  (0.000637)   
Constant  -1.147***  -1.208***  -1.211***  -1.232***  -1.221*** 
  (0.00847)  (0.0229)  (0.0110)  (0.00591)  (0.00383) 
R
2  0.415  0.427  0.444  0.498  0.543 
Observations  410379  410379  410379  410379  410379 
States    30       
Districts      562     
Villages        14895   
Households          124749 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 8 
Pooled  Cross-Sectional Regression of Cognitive Achievement Using Fixed Effects  (Pooling 2005, 
2006 and 2007 data) 
   No FE  State FE  District FE  Village FE  HH FE 
Female  -0.0247***  -0.0268**  -0.0276***  -0.0255***  -0.0275*** 
  (0.00175)  (0.0116)  (0.00283)  (0.00157)  (0.00141) 
Age 7  0.372***  0.371***  0.371***  0.372***  0.377*** 
  (0.00368)  (0.0124)  (0.00508)  (0.00341)  (0.00311) 
Age 8  0.732***  0.736***  0.737***  0.737***  0.752*** 
  (0.00364)  (0.0208)  (0.00652)  (0.00340)  (0.00287) 
Age 9  1.089***  1.089***  1.087***  1.087***  1.097*** 
  (0.00428)  (0.0208)  (0.00790)  (0.00394)  (0.00317) 
Age 10  1.355***  1.358***  1.358***  1.361***  1.386*** 
  (0.00399)  (0.0240)  (0.00834)  (0.00375)  (0.00298) 
Age 11  1.585***  1.586***  1.585***  1.590***  1.615*** 
  (0.00428)  (0.0191)  (0.00833)  (0.00398)  (0.00324) 
Age 12  1.711***  1.712***  1.713***  1.719***  1.748*** 
  (0.00391)  (0.0199)  (0.00828)  (0.00371)  (0.00305) 
Age 13  1.842***  1.844***  1.842***  1.846***  1.871*** 
  (0.00409)  (0.0254)  (0.00880)  (0.00388)  (0.00325) 
Age 14  1.930***  1.929***  1.927***  1.932***  1.954*** 
  (0.00398)  (0.0303)  (0.00899)  (0.00383)  (0.00328) 
Private  0.228***  0.255***  0.241***  0.227***  0.180*** 
  (0.00381)  (0.0383)  (0.00792)  (0.00348)  (0.00292) 
HH size  -0.0113***  -0.00380**  -0.00288***  -0.00481***   
  (0.000590)  (0.00144)  (0.000782)  (0.000486)   
2006  -0.0449***  -0.0460  -0.0450***  -0.0170***   
  (0.00566)  (0.0419)  (0.0139)  (0.00582)   
2007  -0.0326***  -0.0254  -0.0233  -0.00898   
  (0.00634)  (0.0404)  (0.0142)  (0.00669)   
Constant  -1.085***  -1.144***  -1.148***  -1.152***  -1.202*** 
  (0.00670)  (0.0382)  (0.0131)  (0.00606)  (0.00235) 
R
2  0.399  0.408  0.418  0.434  0.514 
Obs.  1109811  1109811  1109811  1109811  1109811 
States    32       
Districts      584     
Villages        17920   
Households          330180 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 9 
Cross-sectional Regression of Cognitive Achievement Using Village Fixed Effects Estimation and 
Including Mother’s Characteristics 
   2006
a  2006  2007  Pooled 
Female  -0.0245***  -0.0245***  -0.0233***  -0.0246*** 
  (0.00218)  (0.00219)  (0.00220)  (0.00170) 
Age 7  0.366***  0.366***  0.362***  0.365*** 
  (0.00501)  (0.00501)  (0.00506)  (0.00378) 
Age 8  0.726***  0.726***  0.739***  0.734*** 
  (0.00494)  (0.00494)  (0.00515)  (0.00375) 
Age 9  1.065***  1.065***  1.097***  1.083*** 
  (0.00577)  (0.00577)  (0.00593)  (0.00438) 
Age 10  1.341***  1.341***  1.390***  1.367*** 
  (0.00551)  (0.00551)  (0.00584)  (0.00416) 
Age 11  1.574***  1.574***  1.625***  1.599*** 
  (0.00586)  (0.00586)  (0.00605)  (0.00442) 
Age 12  1.705***  1.705***  1.752***  1.730*** 
  (0.00561)  (0.00561)  (0.00589)  (0.00417) 
Age 13  1.836***  1.836***  1.882***  1.858*** 
  (0.00576)  (0.00576)  (0.00604)  (0.00432) 
Age 14  1.919***  1.919***  1.966***  1.946*** 
  (0.00583)  (0.00583)  (0.00622)  (0.00434) 
Private  0.185***  0.186***  0.208***  0.174*** 
  (0.00442)  (0.00442)  (0.00461)  (0.00366) 
HH size  -0.00112**  -0.00112**  0.00210***  -0.00458*** 
  (0.000527)  (0.000527)  (0.000632)  (0.000530) 
M age  0.00516***  0.00514***  0.0197***  0.00764*** 
  (0.000925)  (0.000925)  (0.00166)  (0.000933) 
M age
2  -0.0000331***  -0.0000329***  -0.000237***  -0.0000624*** 
  (0.0000110)  (0.0000110)  (0.00002.25)  (0.0000115) 
M grade  0.00842***  0.0197***  0.0155***  0.0272*** 
  (0.00155)  (0.00110)  (0.00114)  (0.000980) 
M grade
2  0.000973***  0.000361***  0.000694***  0.000179** 
  (0.000119)  (0.000104)  (0.000108)  (0.0000904) 
M read
b  0.0570***       
  (0.00569)       
2007        0.00931 
        (0.00573) 
Constant  -1.399***  -1.394***  -1.676***  -1.448*** 
  (0.0191)  (0.0191)  (0.0301)  (0.0189) 
R
2  0.480  0.479  0.505  0.463 
Observations  433972  433972  410379  844351 
Villages  15616  15616  14895  17895 
a Whether the mother could also read was included in these estimates, but not in the subsequent 
regressions, because it was not available. 
b For „Whether the mother could read‟ an additional „missing dummy‟ was included, this effectively 
makes this into a categorical variable where the mother could read, couldn‟t read, or was missing. This 
allowed me to include this variable without which there would have been too many missing to make it 
feasible. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 10 
 Regression of Village Mean Cognitive Achievement, for Each Year and for Pooled Data (Cross-
Sectional) and using Village and Time Fixed Effects(Longitudinal) 
   2005  2006  2007  Pooled  Longitudinal 
Female  -0.0315  -0.0217  0.0128  -0.0118  -0.0841*** 
  (0.0369)  (0.0257)  (0.0279)  (0.0168)  (0.0246) 
Age 7  0.266***  0.323***  0.351***  0.323***  0.352*** 
  (0.0855)  (0.0651)  (0.0628)  (0.0399)  (0.0568) 
Age 8  0.460***  0.613***  0.617***  0.586***  0.745*** 
  (0.0827)  (0.0660)  (0.0626)  (0.0397)  (0.0557) 
Age 9  1.172***  1.056***  1.131***  1.118***  1.175*** 
  (0.0775)  (0.0661)  (0.0628)  (0.0391)  (0.0559) 
Age 10  1.078***  1.257***  1.243***  1.208***  1.331*** 
  (0.0722)  (0.0585)  (0.0576)  (0.0355)  (0.0496) 
Age 11  1.180***  1.455***  1.431***  1.378***  1.342*** 
  (0.0768)  (0.0641)  (0.0638)  (0.0387)  (0.0536) 
Age 12  1.394***  1.516***  1.463***  1.454***  1.556*** 
  (0.0744)  (0.0591)  (0.0586)  (0.0361)  (0.0490) 
Age 13  1.512***  1.810***  1.674***  1.687***  1.681*** 
  (0.0812)  (0.0607)  (0.0631)  (0.0383)  (0.0514) 
Age 14  1.619***  1.977***  1.920***  1.880***  1.837*** 
  (0.0852)  (0.0607)  (0.0619)  (0.0385)  (0.0532) 
Private  0.199***  0.219***  0.289***  0.242***  0.190*** 
  (0.0209)  (0.0146)  (0.0156)  (0.00950)  (0.0166) 
HH size  -0.0368***  -0.0303***  -0.0350***  -0.0335***  -0.0104*** 
  (0.00261)  (0.00179)  (0.00244)  (0.00126)  (0.00203) 
2006        -0.0368***  -0.0334*** 
        (0.00605)  (0.00577) 
2007        -0.0449***  -0.0260*** 
        (0.00604)  (0.00670) 
Constant  -0.695***  -0.922***  -0.909***  -0.831***  -1.002*** 
  (0.0573)  (0.0467)  (0.0460)  (0.0285)  (0.0395) 
R
2  0.174  0.191  0.182  0.182  0.175 
Observations  9037  15616  14895  39548  39548 
Unique obs.          21433 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 11 
Regression of Village Mean Cognitive Achievement Including Mother’s Characteristics. For 2006, 
For 2007,  For Both Years Pooled (Cross-Sectional) and Using Time Fixed Effects (Longitudinal) 
   2006
a    2006  2007  Pooled  Longitudinal 
Female  -0.127***    -0.104***  -0.0557**  -0.0810***  -0.0635* 
  (0.0250)    (0.0246)  (0.0268)  (0.0182)  (0.0330) 
Age 7  0.266***    0.303***  0.321***  0.321***  0.283*** 
  (0.0627)    (0.0621)  (0.0603)  (0.0432)  (0.0779) 
Age 8  0.664***    0.690***  0.669***  0.688***  0.663*** 
  (0.0646)    (0.0631)  (0.0602)  (0.0435)  (0.0754) 
Age 9  0.995***    0.993***  1.044***  1.032***  1.071*** 
  (0.0644)    (0.0632)  (0.0605)  (0.0436)  (0.0784) 
Age 10  1.248***    1.265***  1.217***  1.244***  1.302*** 
  (0.0577)    (0.0560)  (0.0557)  (0.0394)  (0.0700) 
Age 11  1.308***    1.326***  1.347***  1.345***  1.364*** 
  (0.0632)    (0.0614)  (0.0617)  (0.0435)  (0.0755) 
Age 12  1.476***    1.491***  1.460***  1.486***  1.482*** 
  (0.0575)    (0.0568)  (0.0569)  (0.0401)  (0.0690) 
Age 13  1.583***    1.628***  1.556***  1.604***  1.639*** 
  (0.0594)    (0.0585)  (0.0612)  (0.0422)  (0.0703) 
Age 14  1.796***    1.803***  1.841***  1.831***  1.737*** 
  (0.0599)    (0.0587)  (0.0605)  (0.0420)  (0.0742) 
Private  0.0353**    0.0549***  0.141***  0.0951***  0.114*** 
  (0.0148)    (0.0149)  (0.0160)  (0.0109)  (0.0247) 
HH size  -0.0172***    -0.0184***  -0.0191***  -0.0188***  -0.0110*** 
  (0.00175)    (0.00176)  (0.00244)  (0.00143)  (0.00278) 
M age  0.000439    -0.00202  0.0440***  -0.000327  0.0200** 
  (0.00532)    (0.00523)  (0.00989)  (0.00435)  (0.00812) 
M age
2  0.0000444    0.0000760  -0.000653***  0.0000209  -0.000174* 
  (0.0000648)    (0.0000639)  (0.000136)  (0.0000553)  (0.000101) 
M grade  0.0467***    0.0928***  0.0702***  0.0797***  0.0482*** 
  (0.00716)    (0.00645)  (0.00628)  (0.00449)  (0.00841) 
M grade
2  -0.000933    -0.00348***  -0.00191***  -0.00251***  -0.000315 
  (0.000656)    (0.000635)  (0.000628)  (0.000446)  (0.000822) 
M read
  0.235***           
  (0.0159)           
2007          -0.00260  0.00905 
          (0.00522)  (0.00627) 
Constant  -1.173***    -1.122***  -1.815***  -1.114***  -1.595*** 
  (0.110)    (0.108)  (0.177)  (0.0855)  (0.161) 
R
2  0.279    0.266  0.247  0.255  0.205 
Villages  15206
b    15616  14895  30511  30511 
a Whether the mother could also read was included in these estimates, but not in the subsequent 
regressions, because it was not available. 
b The N is slightly smaller because missing values of „mother can read‟ were ignored in calculating 
the proportion of mothers that could read within the village, resulting in some villages for whom this 
value was missing and hence not included in this regression. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 . 
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Table 12 
Estimates of the Effect of Unobservables Using 2006 Data with Village Fixed Effects 
  2006 Village FE   
Female  -0.0245***   
  (0.00218)   
Age 7  0.366***   
  (0.00501)   
Age 8  0.726***   
  (0.00494)   
Age 9  1.065***   
  (0.00577)   
Age 10  1.341***   
  (0.00551)   
Age 11  1.574***   
  (0.00586)   
Age 12  1.705***   
  (0.00561)   
Age 13  1.836***   
  (0.00576)   
Age 14  1.919***   
  (0.00583)   
Private  0.185***   
  (0.00442)   
HH size  -0.00112**   
  (0.000527)   
M age  0.00516***   
  (0.000925)   
M age
2  -0.0000331***   
  (0.0000110)   
M grade  0.00842***   
  (0.00155)   
M grade
2  0.000973***   
  (0.000119)   
M read  0.0570***   
  (0.00569)   
Constant  -1.399***   
  (0.0191)   
R
2      
Observations
  433972   
Bias        0.0341738      
Implied Ratio  5.289288   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 . ** p < 0.05 . * p < 0.1 .   39 
 